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A REALISTIC study of collective bargaining must be concerned with the forces
underlying bargaining power. Jacob J. Kaufman, of the Economics Depart-
ment, University of Buffalo, is realistically oriented and endeavors to point
the pathways toward freer collective bargaining in the railroad industry.
At the outset, the author brings into focus two significant facts of railroad
life. He notes that a small handful of railroad terminals controls the flow of
the bulk of the nation's freight and passenger traffic, and that "this means that
the railroad labor organizations can easily disrupt the transportation system
of the United States by striking certain railroads or terminals."' Secondly,
he observes that "the financial position of the railroads and the procedures
established by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the determination
of rates are such that the railroads find themselves in a position whereby they
are unable to agree across the table to demands for wage increases."2 In this
latter connection, the author offers figures showing that the actual rates of
return on net investment for the years 1940-1952 averaged about four per cent,
almost two per cent less than what the Interstate Commerce Commission re-
garded as the return which "the railroads should earn in a 'constructive
normal year.' "3
Thus, it would appear that strategic economic power of the labor organiza-
tions is wedded to relative economic impotence on the part of the railroads,
with resultant turbulence in collective bargaining relationships. The task of
coping with this imbalance is, of course, complex. The simple solution of re-
ducing the relative economic strength of the labor organizations is neither
countenanced nor acceptable to the author.
Dr. Kaufman expresses the opinion that "we have had compulsory arbitra-
tion, de facto, but not de jure, in the railroad industry," and that "this condition
developed as a result of Presidential intervention, government seizures, and the
issuance of court injunctions." 4 The reality, if not legality, of limitations on
the striking power of labor organizations is squarely presented. In the author's
view, limitations on the strike are equivalent to limitations on free collective
bargaining, and limitations on free collective bargaining are but shackled foot-
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make them illegal. Therefore, the solution is not the banning of strikes, but
the restoration of conditions under which genuine collective bargaining between
the two parties can be carried on." Dr. Kaufman thus rejects any weakening
of the economic power of railroad labor organizations as a possible factor in
"the restoration of conditions under which genuine collective bargaining be-
tween the two parties can be carried on." 0
There exists in the railroad industry a custom of industry-wide collective
bargaining over major economic demands. This is the "given" condition with
which the author deals: the limitations on the striking power of the labor
organizations arise almost entirely in industry-wide bargaining impasses. Con-
ceivably, there would be little or no intervention by the federal government to
limit the striking power of the labor organizations if bargaining were conducted
on a regional or local basis. In the fiscal year 1953, according to the National
Mediation Board, in not one of the seventeen local strikes in the railroad in-
dustry was an emergency board established.7 The forces which have led the
parties to negotiate on an industry-wide basis rather than on a local basis are not
clear, although historically, to this reviewer's knowledge, on the Southeastern
Railroads regional collective bargaining became the practice about 1910 when
individual railroads there refused to be "guinea pigs" or leaders in raising
their wage costs to their competitive disadvantage. Surely, it would seem
that if there is insignificant impairment of the economic power of labor organi-
zations in local bargaining as contrasted with industry-wide bargaining, the
forces which maintain collective bargaining on an industry-wide basis should
be more easily discernible. In this connection, it would have been useful if
the author had brought within the scope of his study the nature and structure
of decision-making power among and within the labor organizations and the
railroads, individually and nationally.
State compulsion of the railroad worker is unequivocally opposed by the
author. In the event of an emergency situation, however, he does recognize
that "the President should take appropriate action, but the action should not
be known prior to the breakdown of negotiations, nor should it be such as to
hurt unduly one party as compared to the other party to the dispute.",, This
proposal would seem to carry much merit in conflict situations where the
bargaining power of the parties is fairly equal. But it is of doubtful value
where the existence of imbalance in bargaining power leaves the weaker party
at the mercy of the stronger, for in such a situation the weaker does not have
the range of alternative choices which underlies the doctrine of freedom of con-
tract. Historically, the railroads have found themselves in the weaker posi-
tion, and they have obtained some refuge in the powers of the federal govern-
ment. It is more than understandable-indeed, it is to be expected-that the
railroads have sought amendment of the Railway Labor Act to establish d
5. "P. 183.
6. Ibid.




jure compulsory arbitration 9 in lieu of the emergency board procedures of
section 10 of the Railway Labor Act.10 Likewise, it is not surprising that the
labor organizations should oppose such amendment. As a practical matter,
the author sees in the emergency board what is equivalent to a board of com-
pulsory arbitration. It is therefore consistent with his overall argument that
he should recommend: "The provision of the Railway Labor Act, as amended,
with respect to the creation of emergency boards, should be eliminated.""1
Elimination of the emergency board provision would not alter the existing
discrepancy in economic bargaining power of the parties. Nor would it leave
a defense against the dangers to the health, welfare, and security of the nation
in the crisis conditions of a national strike. Thus, unless the labor organiza-
tions willingly moderate their wage demands to the economic realities of the
railroad's financial position, the probability of governmental intervention is high
indeed. One of the chief functions of the emergency boards is to bring about
a realistic appraisal by both parties of the kinds and quantities of economic
concessions which are in the area of feasibility without recourse to conflict.
Rather than eliminate the emergency board provision, it would appear to be
desirable to improve the functioning of such boards as recommended by the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by providing a staff of experts
in the field of wages and rules to assist the board in arriving at more correct
determinations of technical questions, and by enlarging the emergency board
to five members, three neutrals and two partisan representatives.1 2 A board so
composed would be better able to protect the public interest in the resolution of
economic issues, and would be in position to communicate with both parties in
testing proposed recommendations. Ultimately, perhaps, such a tripartite
de facto board might develop into a continuing agency and serve as a form
of transitional legislative body for the industry.
If a chief function of the emergency boards is to bring the parties to a
more realistic appraisal of the feasible economic concessions, they must have
a keen and sensitive appreciation of the values of the parties and of the total
environmental forces which may lead the parties to accept peacefully the
board's recommendations. Necessarily, this is a task of delicate balancing,
and therefore it is to be expected, as Dr. Kaufman demonstrates, that there is
considerable flexibility in formulating and applying wage criteria. He notes
that five principal criteria are employed: (1) "changes in the cost of living";
(2) "changes in the productivity of labor"; (3) "wages paid in other indus-
tries"; (4) "maintenance of take-home pay in the face of reduction in hours";
and (5) "ability (or inability) of the employer to pay."1 3 The author declares
that there has been no attempt to develop absolute standards and that "this
9. Hearings before the- Senate Committee on Labor and Pnblic iWelfare on S. 3463,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
10. 44 STAT. 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
11. P. 185.
12. S. REP. No. 496, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1951).
13. P. 97.
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failure may well have played a part in the deterioration in the economic
position of the railroad workers and the increasing dissatisfaction of the rail-
road workers with the wage recommendations of the emergency boards."'
14
In this connection, he points out that from 1936 to 1952, the real wages of oper-
ating workers rose by about 18 per cent as compared with a real wage increase
of 65 per cent for nonoperating workers and 61 per cent for workers in manu-
facturing industries.15 Because this wage pattern is influenced by Government
coercion Dr. Kaufman sees a great need to develop definite wage criteria. "For
when wages are determined freely between labor and management, the criterion
is quite simple: the economic cost to either side for failing to come to an agree-
ment. But if the wages are determined as a result of governmental 'coercive
intervention' objective criteria must be established. It would be desirable to
have them worked out 'primarily by labor and management if the principles of
collective bargaining are to be preserved.' "10 To the extent that the parties,
in arguing their positions before the emergency boards, actually employ such
standards, it is likely that the author's recommendation may in time become
established. Whether, however, such standards would yield to the railroad
worker a wage as high relatively as wages in other industries remains dubious.
It is not unlikely that were it not for the exceptionally strong bargaining power
of railroad labor organizations, railroad wages would have deteriorated even
more relative to nonrailroad wages.
Dr. Kaufman declares his unequivocal opinion that the grievance procedures
for the operating crafts have broken down in the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, First Division. "The large backlog of cases, the large number
of cases brought before the Adjustment Board, and the increasing number of
strikes and theatened strikes over grievances, involving primarily the operating
workers, reflects a basic conflict between the labor organizations and the car-
riers: the former seek not only the maintenance of the working rules by pre-
venting any interpretation that might be adverse to railroad labor but also
their extension regardless of the specific wording of the contract between the
parties. The carriers, however, seek the elimination, or at least the modifica-
tion, of the working rules."'1 7 Looking to economic sources of the conflict over
the working rules-technological changes pressuring the workers to hang on
to the economic security of the established working rules, and competitive
pressures forcing the carriers to seek relief from high cost, uneconomical opera-
tions under the old working rules-economist Kaufman concludes: "What
must be achieved is the elimination or easing of many of the rules which, from
a financial and economic point of view, are undesirable. This must be done,
however, by agreement between the parties."'I s To assist in arriving at such








of representatives of the railroad carriers, railroad labor organizations, and
public members, to survey the entire working rules problem and come forth
with recommendations for changes." 10 Surely, this is a constructive suggestion
and one which might lead to substantial long run improvements in the quality
and kinds of service which the railroads could provide in competition with
other transportation agencies.
This reviewer would not minimize the importance of the economic issues
underlying grievance disputes and the grievance procedure. Nevertheless, it
must not be overlooked that the railroad industry is an authoritarian system.
Semi-militaristic in its organization, it functions through a hierarchy of com-
mand -with concentrated power in its general line officers. In railroading.
numerous complex operations must be highly coordinated and reduced to the
clock-like regularity of the time schedule. Flexibilities of policy are routinized
through the daily drill of applying rules and regulations, in mechanical prece-
dent fashion, so as to achieve what resembles automatic operation. The indi-
vidual railroad worker, like the individual railroad bureaucrat, is, and feels
himself to be, nothing more than a cog in the wheel of the transportation
system. Within this authoritarian system human values may and often do
shrivel and disappear. The working rules offer some relief to individual
frustration and despair and some hope that arbitrary rewards and punishments
will not be handed out. Seniority rules, for example, along with rules requiring
fair procedures in disciplinary matters, serve to protect the otherwise helpless
worker. Moreover, the grievance procedures allow for channeling explosive
emotions arising from accumulated feelings of arbitrariness and injustice,
and, in addition, such procedures offer some support to the individual against
his own feelings of guilt, anxiety, fear, and helplessness in coping with superior
authority. From this point of view, the grievance procedure, clogged with psy-
chologically-based grievances, reflects the poor morale of the railroad worker.
And in dealing with this problem of individual worker morale, the grievance pro-
cedures in the railroad industry may be deemed highly effective. Although the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, was 4,717 cases behind
in its work at the end of the fiscal year, 1952,20 the backlog had been reduced to
2,798 cases at the end of the fiscal year, 1954, out of a total of 32,106 cases
docketed since 1934.21 Despite the prospects of long delay in the determination
of an individual case, the certainty and simplicity of appeal to the Adjustment
Board compels the parties to substitute reasonable and consistent standards of
grievance determination for arbitrary action. Thus, to this reviewer's view, the
rule of law replaces arbitrary power exercised in an authoritarian setting. In-
dustrial jurisprudence, founded on principles of constitutional law and growing
out of the common law heritage, emerges.2- The principle of justice in human
19. P. 186.
20. P. 145.
21. 20 NAT. RR. ADj. BD. lsT Div. ANe. R P. table 2 (1954).
22. See, in this connection, LAZAR, DuE PRocEss ON THIE RaILIoA iS: Djtimt
GRiuvANcF PRCEDURES BEFORE THE NATION.AL r]A.ROAi ADJUSTME:NT BOAmw, FI[tvT
DivisioN (1953).
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relations is encouraged to flow through the grievance procedures and transform
the automaton-like railroad worker into a dignified human being with spirit
and soul.
Dr. Kaufman seemingly equates free collective bargaining with the
process of reaching agreement in direct and unhampered across-the-
table bargaining between the parties. This view seems not to accord
proper weight to the ultimate goals of collective bargaining-the enhancement
of individual worth and self-determination within the framework of values
embraced by a democratic society. Success or failure of collective bargaining
in any industry must, then, be measured by the direction and degree to which
such values are realized. The establishment of institutions of consent under
the Railway Labor Act, safeguarded by constitutionally protected concepts of
due process of law, reflects the genius of the democratic society and should
offer Dr. Kaufman strong assurance that continued federal involvement in col-
lective bargaining in the railroad industry is in the direction not of serfdom
but of human freedom.
JosEpH LAZAR i"
CRIME AND THE SERVICES. By John Spencer. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul Ltd., 1954. Pp. xii, 306. 28s.
HERE is a book about the criminal behavior of British servicemen which
may be read with profit by criminologists and staff officers in the military of
any nation. Heretofore, the general area of war and crime has been studied
by a number of European and American scholars such as Novicow,' Ferrero,-
Steinmetz,3 Constatin, 4 Le Bon,5 and Sorokin,0 but this book is one of the few
to deal both with offenses within the armed forces and with deviant behavior
of soldiers after demobilization. Stereotype thinking and folk judgments that
"soldiering is brutal and licentious" die hard. But Mr. Spencer demonstrates
that military service does not make criminals out of good men, although neither
does it rehabilitate civil offenders or the seriously maladjusted. Many of the
same factors which cause criminal behavior in civil life are operative in the
army. The most that military duty does is to accentuate them. Crime and He
Services leaves no cavil that military duty itself is not the primary cause for
the high incidence of crime in the services or in the post-war years.
tLecturer in Business Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
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